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Municipal Supervision and State Action
Antitrust Immunity
Mark A. Perryt
"We are a nation not of 'city-states' but of States."1
INTRODUCTION
In 1890, Congress declared illegal every "contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."2 Fifty years later, the
Supreme Court recognized an exception as deceptively simple as
the statute itself: "the Sherman Act . . . must be taken to be a
prohibition of individual and not state action." Thus was born the
state action doctrine, which effectively immunizes anticompetitive
conduct by states from federal antitrust liability.
4
Under certain circumstances, private parties may also avail
themselves of state action immunity. Otherwise, a plaintiff could
defeat anticompetitive regulation by suing the regulated entity
rather than the regulating authority.5 The Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated a two-part test to evaluate such claims for immunity: the
challenged activity must be pursuant to state authorization, and it
must be "'actively supervised' by the State itself."' Since an-
nouncing this test, the Court has repeatedly cited lack of adequate
t B.A. 1988, The University of California at Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 1991, The Uni-
versity of Chicago.
Community Communications Co., Inc. v City of Boulder, 455 US 40, 54 (1982), citing
630 F2d 704, 717 (10th Cir 1980) (Markey dissenting).
I Sherman Act § 1, 15 USC § 1 (1988).
Parker v Brown, 317 US 341, 352 (1943).
4 The state action doctrine is also known as the Parker doctrine, after the case in which
it was announced. Most of the litigated state action cases involve the Sherman Act, and this
Comment will focus on that statute. The doctrine may also be invoked in similar proceed-
ings under other antitrust statutes. See, for example, FTC v Indiana Federation of Den-
tists, 476 US 447, 449, 465 (1986) (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 USC § 45(a)(1)
(1988)).
5 See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v United States, 471 US 48, 57
(1985): "We decline to reduce Parker's holding to a formalism that would stand for little
more than the proposition that Porter Brown [the plaintiff in Parker] sued the wrong par-
ties." (citing Cantor v Detroit Edison Co., 428 US 579, 616 n 4 (1976) (Stewart dissenting)).
' California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 US 97, 105
(1980) ("Midcal"); Southern Motor Carriers, 471 US at 57.
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supervision as grounds for denying state action immunity to pri-
vate parties.7 Despite the importance of the supervision require-
ment to state action analysis, two questions remain unanswered:
first, why should supervision be necessary at all, and second, what
constitutes supervision by the "State itself"?
In Section I of this Comment, I describe the foundations and
purpose of the Supreme Court's two-part state action test. I argue
that while both prongs serve to ensure that the anticompetitive
practice is consistent with state policy, courts rely more heavily on
supervision than authorization because of concerns with judicial
competence and federalism.
Because a wide range of governmental functions must be dele-
gated, however, courts are forced to determine which governmental
units can supervise private actors. The Supreme Court has de-
clared that the state legislature and highest court are sovereign,
and therefore supervision by those bodies is state supervision. In
Section II, I discuss the issue of supervision by subordinate gov-
ernmental entities, and conclude that state agencies can properly
exercise supervisory powers; I then address the question of
whether municipal supervision should satisfy the test for state ac-
tion immunity.
The problem of municipal supervision generally arises in cases
involving local services; most of the reported decisions involve taxi-
cabs, garbage companies, and ambulance services.8 With taxicabs,
as with most local services, the municipality has two options: it can
allow anyone who qualifies to provide transportation services, or it
could regulate the number of cabs and the price charged." If the
regulatory approach is chosen, a frustrated rival 0 is likely to sue
the incumbent firm1 in an attempt to gain entry; the question
presented is whether and how the state action defense should be
available when the putative supervisor is a municipality.
7 See, for example, 324 Liquor Corp. v Duffy, 479 US 335 (1987); Patrick v Burget, 486
US 94 (1988); see text at note 22.
8 See note 64.
See text at notes 64-85.
20 A frustrated rival firm will be the most likely plaintiff because it will have the great-
est incentive to sue. This Comment will assume that such a rival will be able to prove "anti-
trust injury." See Brunswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 US 477 (1977). The
arguments herein apply equally to other situations, such as suits brought by the
government.
1 Frustrated rivals also frequently sue the city itself. For an introduction to the issues
raised when the defendant is a municipality, see Herbert Hovenkamp and John A. Macker-
ron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L Rev 719 (1985).
This Comment will be concerned, however, only with private defendants.
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In Section III, I argue that municipal oversight should not sat-
isfy the active supervision requirement. Private defendants should
be required to show that they are supervised by the state itself,
defined as the legislature, highest court, or an agency with state-
wide powers. This approach will best achieve the goals of the state
action doctrine: promoting free competition and thereby enhancing
consumer welfare, while at the same time preserving the comity
relationship between the state and national governments that is
mandated by our federal system. Finally, in Section IV, I discuss
the applicability of other limitations on antitrust liability, and ad-
dress objections to the position advocated.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS AND PURPOSE OF THE AcTIvE
SUPERVISION REQUIREMENT
The state action doctrine was announced by the Supreme
Court in Parker v Brown,12 which involved a system of state-en-
forced cartelization that severely curtailed California's raisin out-
put. Relying on the concept of federalism, the Court held that the
challenged activity did not violate the Sherman Act because the
antitrust laws prohibit individual rather than state action.
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitu-
tion, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may con-
stitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program
made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspir-
acy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sov-
ereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which
the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit."3
The federalism rationale has remained at the heart of the
state action doctrine and is critical to understanding the proper
"2 317 US 341 (1943).
13 Id at 351-52. The other grounds for the decision were the legislative history and the
language of the Sherman Act. Id at 351. The inconclusiveness of the legislative history of
this law has often been cited, however; see, for example, Paul E. Slater, Antitrust and Gov-
ernment Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw U L Rev 71, 83 (1974)
("In truth, a full reading of the legislative history of the Sherman Act is not likely to help
answer the Parker question one way or the other."). Furthermore, the broad language of the
statute supports many other readings. Later courts have not relied on either the legislative
history or the words of the Sherman Act to interpret or revise the state action doctrine.
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course of its development. But even though Parker exhibited ex-
treme deference to the states, the Court was unwilling to exempt
anticompetitive activities in which the government was only nomi-
nally involved. "[A] state does not give immunity to those who vio-
late the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by de-
claring their action is lawful.' 1 4 For forty years, however, a
majority of the Court was unable to agree on the level of state in-
volvement that would trigger state action immunity. 15
Then, in Midcal, a unanimous Court announced a two-
pronged test to evaluate Parker claims. "First, the challenged re-
straint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised by
the State itself."'" Midcal involved a California statute that re-
sulted in fixed minimum wine prices. The state authorized the
price setting and enforced the resulting prices, but it did not en-
gage in any review of the prices set. The Court held that the sec-
ond prong of the newly announced test was not satisfied, and
therefore that the state action doctrine was inapplicable. "The na-
tional policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting
such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a
private price-fixing arrangement."'"
When applying the first prong of the Midcal test, the Court
has drawn a distinction between sovereign and other state actors.
In the former category are the legislature and the state's highest
court;' 8 all other subdivisions of state authority are in the latter.
The necessary authorization must come from the state as sover-
eign.' 9 This differential treatment of state organs is based on feder-
alism. The federal government is bound to respect the regulatory
choices of independent sovereigns, but there is no reason to pay
such deference to non-sovereign state agencies or municipalities. °
14 Parker, 317 US at 351.
15 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J L &
Econ 23, 26 (1983).
1 Midcal, 445 US at 105 (internal quotations omitted), quoting City of Lafayette v
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 US 389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion).
17 445 US at 106.
"s The governor is probably also a sovereign actor, but the Supreme Court has expressly
declined to decide this issue. Hoover v Ronwin, 466 US 558, 568 n 17 (1984).
" "Parker immunity is available only when the challenged activity is undertaken pur-
suant to a clearly articulated policy of the State itself, such as a policy approved by a state
legislature... or a State Supreme Court." Southern Motor Carriers, 471 US at 63 (citations
omitted).
10 Some commentators have criticized this distinction, noting that in other areas involv-
ing federalism, the Court has in fact deferred to municipalities. See, for example, Boulder,
455 US at 69-71 (Rehnquist dissenting); Easterbrook, 26 J L & Econ at 36-38 & n 31 (cited
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But if requiring sovereign authority ensures that the anticom-
petitive activity is in fact a policy to which the federal government
owes deference, what is the purpose of the supervision require-
ment? Strictly speaking, requiring active supervision is unneces-
sary, or even contrary, to the federalism rationale. Once a state has
made a considered choice to displace competition, one could argue
that courts should defer to the state's decision, regardless of its
method of implementation."' Nevertheless, the Court has rigor-
ously applied the supervision requirement, striking down three of
the four regulatory schemes it has considered under this test."
The continued vitality of the supervision requirement repre-
sents an attempt by the Court to reconcile federalism concerns
with the practical problems inherent in delegating regulatory
power: a private party could carry out an initially authorized
scheme in a manner inconsistent with state policy. "Authoriza-
tion," as a legal concept, means that an entity has certain enumer-
ated powers by operation of law. When the entity exceeds the
scope of that authorization, it loses any protection the law may
have afforded. 3 Applied to the state action context, this reasoning
indicates that private anticompetitive activities that were not con-
templated by the state should not receive the benefit of Parker
immunity.
Federal courts, however, are ill-equipped to evaluate the con-
gruence between the challenged activity and the purported state
policy. First, a judicial attempt to examine the specific relationship
between an activity and the state policy would raise serious proce-
dural problems. Claims of state action immunity are usually raised
in note 15). This criticism fails in the state action field, however, for two reasons. First, the
state-municipal distinction is consistent with the Sherman Act's economic goal of promoting
allocative efficiency; to achieve this end, courts should construe exemptions as narrowly as
possible. See text at notes 95-96. Furthermore, despite its federalism jurisprudence in other
areas, the Court has consistently afforded less deference to municipalities than states in
antitrust actions; the distinction is thus entrenched as precedent. See text at notes 44-52.
'" William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruc-
tion and Critique of the State Action Exemption after Midcal Aluminum, 61 BU L Rev
1099, 1129 (1981).
12 Midcal, 445 US at 105-06; 324 Liquor, 479 US at 344-45; Patrick, 486 US at 101-06.
In the fourth case the government conceded that the activity was actively supervised, so the
Court did not have occasion to consider the issue. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 US at 62,
66. See also Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 465 (striking down private anticom-
petitive behavior, although it was claimed to be consistent with state policy, because of the
lack of state supervision).
2' This is the concept of ultra vires acts, familiar from many areas of the law. See, for
example, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89 (1984) (discussing
relation between ultra vires acts by state officials and sovereign immunity).
1990] 1417
The University of Chicago Law Review
and decided at the pretrial stage, on motions to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment. Since the state action doctrine excludes certain
conduct from antitrust scrutiny, an inquiry into state policy and
its relation to the challenged activity would raise difficult questions
of fact and would obviate the Parker doctrine's effectiveness in
disposing of meritless litigation. This harms not only the litigants,
whose costs will increase, but also the public generally because of
the added burden on the already-overworked judiciary.
More fundamentally, such an inquiry would involve federal
courts in substantive review of state policy. It would be strange
irony indeed if the Parker doctrine, founded on federalism, were
interpreted to require federal involvement in state affairs. Deter-
minations of whether a challenged activity accords with state pol-
icy should be made by the state itself. But a federal court
presented with an antitrust claim must have some means of evalu-
ating whether the state has in fact made that determination. The
supervision requirement is such a device. The court can use the
ongoing involvement of some state entity as a proxy for authoriza-
tion. The state supervision requirement thus ensures that only
those activities that accord with state interests, and thus can truly
be called "state action," will escape federal antitrust liability.
This interpretation of the supervision requirement appears
clearly in Hallie, where the Court held that when the defendant is
a municipality, state supervision need not be shown.24 The Court
reasoned that the supervision requirement essentially serves an ev-
identiary function, to ensure that the actor is actually furthering a
state policy rather than a private anticompetitive scheme. 2' The
Court argued that since municipalities are presumed to be acting
for the public good, evidence of supervision was not necessary; the
requirement of state authorization provided an adequate
safeguard.26
The same day, however, the Court decided Southern Motor
Carriers, holding that both Midcal requirements remain fully ap-
plicable to private parties.27 The Court explained that the active
supervision requirement is necessary to ensure "that a State's ac-
tions will immunize the anticompetitive conduct of private parties
only when the 'state has demonstrated its commitment to a pro-
2 Town of Hallie v City of Eau Claire, 471 US 34 (1985).
25 Id at 46-47.
28 Id.
27 471 US at 57.
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gram through its exercise of regulatory oversight.' ,,2S Private par-
ties are treated differently than municipalities because of the
greater probability that private actors behave anticompetitively for
their own benefit.2 9 The additional requirement of active supervi-
sion ensures that the state is sufficiently concerned with the
scheme that competition should give way to comity.3 0
I. SUPERVISION BY SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
States are composed of legislative, executive, and judicial
branches; they encompass numerous agencies and departments;
and they include many local governmental units such as counties,
school districts, and municipalities. Each of these units of govern-
ment is in some way a part of the "state itself," but they are not all
equal for purposes of state action analysis. Only sovereign entities
can provide the requisite authorization, 31 but can non-sovereign
state organs satisfy the second Midcal requirement-active
supervision?
A. State Agencies
State agencies do not act in a sovereign capacity, and therefore
cannot authorize anticompetitive conduct. In Goldfarb, for exam-
ple, the Virginia State Bar had promulgated a minimum fee sched-
ule and required lawyers to follow it as part of the ethical code.32
Although the association was a state agency, the Court held that
lawyers following the fee schedule were not immune from antitrust
liability. The Court declared that only the state acting as sovereign
could supply such immunity; because neither the legislature nor
the state supreme court had done so, the state action doctrine was
inapplicable.3 This view was followed in Southern Motor Carriers,
where the private defendants' actions were authorized by a state
" Id at 61 n 23, quoting Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, 1 Antitrust Law I 213a
at 73 (Little, Brown, 1978).
'9 "We may presume ... that the municipality acts in the public interest. A private
party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf."
Hallie, 471 US at 45 (footnote omitted).
"o "This supervision requirement prevents the State from frustrating the national pol-
icy in favor of competition by casting a 'gauzy cloak of state involvement' over what is
essentially private anticompetitive conduct." Southern Motor Carriers, 471 US at 57, quot-
ing Midcal, 445 US at 106.
31 See text at notes 18-19.
32 Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773 (1975).
" Id at 790-91.
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agency; the Court nevertheless required authorization by the legis-
lature or state supreme court.8 4
However, state agencies can provide supervision sufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the Midcal test. The Fifth Circuit in
Southern Motor Carriers, for example, found that the requirement
was satisfied because the state Public Service Commission actively
supervised the defendants' activities.3 In the Supreme Court the
government conceded that the agency supervision was sufficient,
and the Court therefore analyzed only the authorization require-
ment." And in Patrick, the defendants claimed that two different
state agencies supervised their conduct.3 7 The Court held that the
supervision requirement was not satisfied because of the specific
procedures and practices of the respective agencies; 3 significantly,
the Court did not hold that agency supervision of private conduct
is per se insufficient.39 Furthermore, the lower courts have uni-
formly held that agency supervision satisfies Midcal.40
The authorization and supervision requirements are treated
differently for practical reasons. The Court requires sovereign au-
thorization because otherwise the federal government would owe
no deference to the anticompetitive policy. But to require the leg-
islature or state high court to supervise all properly authorized ac-
tivity would be an administrative nightmare. Because the active
supervision requirement calls for substantive review by a responsi-
ble authority,41 requiring sovereign supervision would clog the leg-
islature or the courts with grievances about competition.
Authorizing state agencies to supervise the activity, on the
other hand, ensures that aggrieved parties have a forum in which
to air their complaints; at the same time, the goals of federalism
are furthered because the state agency acts in the state's interest
and enforces state policy.42 State agencies are in the best position
31 471 US at 62-63.
35 702 F2d 532, 539 & n 12 (5th Cir 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 US 48 (1985).
s6 471 US at 63, 66.
W The agencies were the state Board of Medical Examiners and the state Health Divi-
sion. Patrick, 486 US at 101.
's See text at notes 100-01.
s See Philip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 212.7 at 884 (Little,
Brown, Supp 1988) ("Patrick suggests that 'active supervision' means that a state agency
reviews specific decisions of private parties on their substantive merits and not merely on
their procedural adequacy." (emphasis added)).
o See, for example, New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v FTC, 908 F2d 1064, 1077
(1st Cir 1990); Benson v Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners, 673 F2d 272, 275 (9th
Cir 1982); see also Shahawy v Harrison, 875 F2d 1529, 1535 (11th Cir 1989).
4 See text at notes 97-103.
42 See Kenneth Culp Davis, 1 Administrative Law § 3:15 at 208 (KC Davis, 2d ed 1978)
(task of the legislature is to formulate "major policies and main outlines," whereas the "rel-
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to evaluate the application of state policy to particular instances of
anticompetitive conduct. They can and should make the determi-
nation whether the challenged activity is "authorized" by the state;
the federal antitrust court can then limit its inquiry to whether the
agency is in fact exercising its duty to oversee the private parties.
This two-step approach ensures that the activity is pursuant to
state policy and at the same time affords sufficient deference to
state decisions and processes.
B. Municipalities
Like agencies, municipalities are not sovereign; therefore, they
may not authorize anticompetitive conduct.43 But they are unlike
state agencies because of their parochial nature, and it is not clear
whether their supervision of private parties can satisfy the second
prong of the Midcal test.
1. Municipal supervision in the Supreme Court.
Three of the state action cases decided by the Supreme Court
involved municipalities: Lafayette," Boulder,45 and Hallie." Al-
though they involve municipalities as defendants rather than as
supervisors, these cases illustrate the Court's attitudes toward mu-
nicipal governments. The Court has consistently, and rightly, re-
fused to extend the same deference to municipalities as it does to
states.47 Economic choices made by municipal governments might
harm some consumers, either by design or effect. The state action
doctrine acknowledges this possibility at the state level, but for
reasons of comity leaves state regulations unchallenged. At the mu-
nicipal level, however, no such political benefit is achieved. "To
permit municipalities to be shielded from the antitrust laws [ab-
sent state authorization] would impair the goals Congress sought
to achieve by those laws, without furthering the policy underlying
the Parker 'exemption.' ,148
ative details" are best left to administrative agencies).
43 See, for example, Boulder, 455 US at 53-54.
4- 435 US 389 (1978) (municipal utility company not ipso facto immune from antitrust
challenge because of its governmental nature).
45 455 US 40 (1982) ("home rule" powers granted by state constitution do not confer
state action immunity).
1 471 US 34 (1985) (municipal regulation pursuant to proper state authorization cov-
ered by Parker doctrine).
47 See Lafayette, 435 US at 412 (plurality opinion): "Cities are not themselves sover-
eign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create them."
" Lafayette, 435 US at 415 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court's opinions firmly establish that a munici-
pality is not free to implement an independent regulatory regime.
Rather, municipalities are constrained by the principles of compe-
tition and federalism. Any municipal regulation must comply with
one or the other: it must be independently congruent with anti-
trust policy, or it must be pursuant to state authorization and
hence exempt under the Parker doctrine.49 If municipalities are
thus so limited in their own anticompetitive activities, it follows a
fortiori that their power to regulate private parties must be simi-
larly limited.
In Hallie, the Court stated in a footnote that "where state or
municipal regulation [of] a private party is involved . . . active
state supervision must be shown."50 Although this language seems
to decide the issue of municipal supervision in the negative, com-
mentators either ignore it or discount its importance, arguing that
the issue of municipal supervision was not before the Court and
that the footnote therefore refers to some other issue.5 1 It is at
least as plausible, however, that the Court has concluded that mu-
nicipal supervision is not sufficient for state action purposes.
The natural reading of the Hallie footnote is that it requires
state supervision even when municipal regulation is involved. This
reading is supported by Patrick, the Court's most recent opinion
discussing the active supervision requirement:
The requirement is designed to ensure that the state action
doctrine will shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts
of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually
further state regulatory policies. To accomplish this purpose,
the active supervision requirement mandates that the State
exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive
conduct.2
Supervision by a municipality would deprive the state of "ultimate
control" over the challenged activity; allowing municipal supervi-
sion to satisfy the Midcal test thus directly conflicts with the plain
language of the Patrick decision.
I
See Boulder, 455 US at 57: "[W]hen the State itself has not directed or authorized an
anticompetitive practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must
obey the antitrust laws." (quoting Lafayette, 435 US at 416 (plurality opinion)).
50 471 US at 46 n 10 (emphasis added).
5' See, for example, Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 212.7 at 158 (cited in
note 39): "[T]he context indicates that the Court was contrasting private with public activ-
ity-requiring supervision of the former but not of the latter-rather than discussing the
identity of the supervisor."
52 486 US at 100-01 (emphasis added).
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2. Municipal supervision in the lower courts.
The lower courts are split on the question of municipal super-
vision. Most courts that have considered the issue allow municipal
supervision to satisfy the Midcal test, although usually with little
discussion. For example, in Trinity Ambulance, the court held that
the state action doctrine immunized the grantees of an exclusive
municipal ambulance franchise where the state authorized the city
to provide for ambulance services." The court deemed municipal
supervision sufficient, noting that the "official supervision of the
ambulance companies in this case is at least equivalent in degree
to the official supervision of private defendants that was deemed
sufficient" in Southern Motor Carriers.4 In a similar case plain-
tiffs challenged the grant of an exclusive franchise to one taxicab
company. 5 The court surveyed the Supreme Court state supervi-
sion cases and summarily concluded that the private defendants
were immune because the city supervised their conduct. 6
The Sixth Circuit, in contrast, has held that municipal super-
vision is insufficient. The leading case is Riverview Investments, in
which the plaintiff alleged that the refusal of a municipally con-
trolled development corporation to issue revenue bonds restrained
trade by preventing the creation of new businesses.57 After the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the defendant, the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. In its initial remand or-
der, the Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to consider the
state action doctrine, and specifically whether the municipality su-
pervised the challenged conduct. The plaintiff petitioned for a re-
hearing, and the court criticized its earlier language regarding mu-
nicipal supervision: "In light of Town of Hallie and Southern
Motor Carriers, that statement may not be a completely accurate
statement of the law."5" The court therefore modified the order to
require state supervision.59
U Trinity Ambulance Service, Inc. v G & L Ambulance Service, Inc., 625 F Supp 142
(D Conn 1985), afi'd per curiam, 787 F2d 86 (2d Cir 1986).
625 F Supp at 145.
Woolen v Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 615 F Supp 344 (N D Tex 1985).
56 Id at 350.
57 Riverview Investments, Inc. v Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 774 F2d 162,
modifying 769 F2d 324 (6th Cir 1985).
58 774 F2d at 163.
59 On a later appeal in the same case, the court affirmed the state-municipal distinction.
899 F2d 474, 476 n 2, 478-81 (6th Cir 1990).
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Riverview Investments was interpreted and followed in City
Communications.6 0 There, the plaintiff, a frustrated rival, sued the
successful bidder for a cable television franchise. The defendant
argued that it was exempt under the state action doctrine because
it was supervised by the city of Detroit. The court held: "While
some courts do permit municipal supervision to meet the state su-
pervision requirement [citing Trinity Ambulance], that is not the
law of this circuit. In Riverview, the Sixth Circuit expressly held
that private parties seeking state action immunity must demon-
strate that they have been supervised by the state, not by the
municipality. '61
The Riverview Investments court gave no reason for its deci-
sion, other than its belief that it was following Hallie and South-
ern Motor Carriers. And the City Communications court merely
followed circuit precedent; it offered no independent analysis of
why municipal supervision should not satisfy Midcal. Similarly, in
both Trinity Ambulance and Woolen, as well as in other cases al-
lowing municipal supervision to satisfy Midcal,62 the courts did not
offer any justification for their holdings. The courts also uniformly
fail to recognize or address the problems inherent in municipal
regulation.
The Supreme Court's opinions indicate that municipal super-
vision should not be sufficient to confer Parker immunity, but the
Court has not definitively addressed the issue. The lower courts
are divided, and, more importantly, none offers a compelling rea-
son why one approach should be preferred. A principled solution to
the question of municipal supervision must give appropriate
weight to both the economic and the political considerations em-
bodied in the state action doctrine.
III. PROBLEMS WITH MUNICIPAL SUPERVISION AND A
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Municipal supervision should not be sufficient to confer anti-
trust immunity on private actors." Rather, ultimate supervision by
60 City Communications, Inc. v City of Detroit, 660 F Supp 932, denying reconsidera-
tion of 650 F Supp 1570 (E D Mich 1987).
81 Id at 935.
82 See, for example, Vartan v Harristown Development Corp., 655 F Supp 430, 437-38
(M D Pa 1987), alf'd by order, 838 F2d 1206 (3d Cir 1988); see also Savage v Waste Man-
agement, Inc., 623 F Supp 1505 (D SC 1985) (holding supervision by county sufficient).
63 This Comment assumes that the private party is in fact engaging in anticompetitive
activity that would, absent state action immunity, violate the Sherman Act.
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a state agency should be required. This approach will enhance con-
sumer welfare by increasing competition, and it conforms with the
federalism framework established by the Supreme Court in prior
state action cases.
A. Regulation or Competition: Problems with Municipal
Supervision
A simplified model based on the provision of airport taxicab
services demonstrates the difficulties inherent in municipal super-
vision of private actors.6 ' A municipality has two basic options
when evaluating the provision of taxicab services to arriving pas-
sengers. The first is regulation: the city can grant one company an
exclusive franchise to provide taxi service; some form of rate regu-
lation would also be necessary.65 The alternative is competition:
the city can allow individual taxi drivers (or companies) to bargain
directly with consumers for the provision of transportation
services.6 6
The regulatory model, under which the municipality contracts
with one firm for the benefit of its citizens, involves some transac-
tion and information costs. But since only one "deal" is required,
the net cost will be much lower than under the competitive model;
this is the primary benefit of regulation. 7 The administrative cost
of the system is the principal cost of the regulatory model. Because
the licensed company will have monopoly power, it may charge
" Airport taxi franchising is the most common source of litigation involving municipal
supervision. See, for example, Independent Taxicab Drivers' Employees v Greater Houston
Trans. Co., 760 F2d 607 (5th Cir 1985) (Houston Intercontinental Airport); Woolen, 615 F
Supp 344 (Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v
SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 562 F Supp 712 (D Hawaii 1983) (Honolulu International Airport);
All American Cab Co. v Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, 547 F Supp 509 (E D
Tenn 1982) (McGhee-Tyson Airport [Knoxville]). Similar exclusive franchises are often
granted for trash-hauling companies, see Tom Hudson & Assoc., Inc. v City of Chula Vista,
746 F2d 1370 (9th Cir 1984); ambulance services, see Trinity Ambulance, 625 F Supp 142;
and taxicab services generally, see Golden State Transit Corp. v City of Los Angeles, 726
F2d 1430 (9th Cir 1984). The analysis in such cases is substantially similar to that presented
in the text.
"' The city need not grant such a license to only one company; there may be two (or
ten). The analysis is similar, however, and the single-firm model will be used for the sake of
simplicity.
46 Of course, under neither approach will there be pure competition or pure regulation;
any intermediate approach, however, will share the characteristics and problems of the polar
examples used for illustration.
17 See Mark W. Frankena and Paul A. Pautler, An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Reg-
ulation 3-4 (FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report, 1984). Regulation also reduces price
discrimination by drivers. Id at 3. See text at notes 75-82 for a discussion of other rationales
for local services regulation.
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consumers more than they would have to pay if taxi services oper-
ated in a free market. The city must therefore regulate the rates
which taxicabs can charge and set up a system of monitoring and
enforcement to ensure compliance." In addition, the city must po-





Such a regulatory regime will result in allocative inefficiency,
regardless of whether the taxi companies are permitted to charge a
supracompetitive price. A system of entry regulation will shift the
quantity of available taxis from q1 (the competitive equilibrium)
to q2.69 The regulators then have two choices: the price can be al-
lowed to rise to p2, or they can impose a ceiling at pl. Under the
first approach, the taxicab companies gain the transfer payment
from consumers represented by the hatched rectangle. Society as a
whole, however, loses the consumers' and producers' surplus, rep-
resented by the shaded triangle.7 0 If the price is held at pl, on the
other hand, society still bears the deadweight loss represented by
the shaded triangle; in addition, the difference in price between pl
and p2 will be borne by consumers in the form of increased waiting
time. 1 Waiting time will increase because, at the lower fare pl,
more customers will demand the services of the same number of
taxis. In both cases, the effective price to consumers is p2;72 at that
price some will engage in inefficient substitution.
" The city may be able to enter into a long-term contract with a fixed price provision,
but monitoring costs as well as the renegotiations that are inevitable in light of changing
economic conditions will produce a cost structure similar to regulation.
"' The assumption that entry regulation will reduce available quantity is confirmed by
the empirical observation that after entry regulations are eliminated, the number of total
taxicabs and cab-hours of service increases. See Frankena and Pautler, An Economic Analy-
sis of Taxicab Regulation at 116-17 (cited in note 67).
"' Jack Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 249-50 (Prentice-Hall, 3d ed 1984).
7. Id at 221-25, 227-31. While the transfer payment from consumers to producers disap-
pears under a price ceiling system, society incurs additional social costs, represented by the
hatched rectangle, in the form of waiting time and inefficient allocation of taxicab resources.
71 Frankena and Pautler, An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation 117-18 (cited in
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The competitive model contemplates an unlimited number of
providers bargaining directly with consumers of taxi services. Con-
sumers benefit because the system is not run by the municipality,
which reduces administrative costs and frees revenue for other
uses. An unregulated market will also result in a supply-demand
equilibrium, eliminating the deadweight loss and enhancing alloca-
tive efficiency. The costs of the competitive model are primarily
the transaction costs incurred by requiring a large number of indi-
vidual bargains.7 There is also an information cost problem; con-
sumers must expend resources to determine which company best
suits individual requirements. 74
How will the municipality choose between these alternative
models? As a first approximation, it is unclear why a municipality
would ever choose a system of regulation. Its own administrative
costs are much higher than those under a competitive regime, and
consumers will likely be worse off because of a reduction in choice
and an increase in price. Furthermore, the lost consumer and pro-
ducer surplus constitutes a deadweight loss to society.
The traditional explanations for economic regulation are natu-
ral monopoly, excessive competition, transaction costs, and scarce
resources.7 5 Only the excessive competition and transaction costs
rationales apply to most local services. But the excessive competi-
tion theory has been largely discredited; the complaint usually
stems from the incumbent firms who want governmental protec-
tion from the ordinary rigors of the marketplace.76 And while the
note 67), note that the increased number of taxis following entry deregulation is accompa-
nied by a decrease in consumer waiting time, suggesting that the fare ceilings were set below
the market-clearing price (p2). The same study also concludes that in at least one area fares
declined following deregulation, id at 115-16, which suggests that the regulated fare was
higher than the competitive fare (pl). The actual money fare under a system of entry regu-
lation, therefore, is probably between pl and p2, while the remaining difference is borne by
the consumers as waiting time.
7 The bargained-for fare, of course, must be set ex ante to avoid the problems of bilat-
eral monopoly. Transaction costs are reduced to the extent that firms set fares at a uniform
level within the firm, rather than for each rider.
7' This problem is reduced, at least in the airport taxi market, by the rule or custom of
taking the first cab in the queue. Also, if safety and competence factors continue to be
regulated, consumers should be generally indifferent among cab companies. In the absence
of price regulation, any differences in quality of service (for example, age of car or air condi-
tioning) could be reflected in the price.
" Thomas D. Morgan, Jeffrey L. Harrison, and Paul R. Verkuil, Economic Regulation
of Business 15-20 (West, 2d ed 1985); see also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform
ch 1 (Harvard, 1982).
7' See, for example, Breyer, Regulation and its Reform at 29-32 (cited in note 75).
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transaction costs problem (particularly pollution-related externali-
ties) may be real, simple entry restrictions may not be the efficient
solution."
Some local services, such as cable television, have many fea-
tures of prototypical natural monopolies like electricity delivery.78
But the economies of scale and scope would seem to be exhausted
relatively quickly. For example, cable operators in Houston divided
the city into several cable areas, each with a separate provider. 9
Although the cable operators had illegally conspired in dividing
the market, the Fifth Circuit found that the division itself was rea-
sonable. Furthermore, competition for the initial franchise and re-
newal contracts can produce the beneficial effects of a competitive
market, even when a single provider is optimal, without the admin-
istrative or efficiency costs of a regulatory scheme."
A more persuasive explanation for local services regulation is a
producer capture theory: regulated industries benefit from regula-
tion, and thus play an instrumental role in the enactment of regu-
latory legislation.81 Existing taxi companies want as few competi-
tors as possible and will expend resources to convince the
municipality to grant them an exclusive contract.2 By using the
7 See Frankena and Pautler, An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation at 42-43
(cited in note 67). Another possible explanation is that the municipality is attempting to
achieve some social goal other than the optimal provision of taxicab services. This story is at
least plausible in some cases where public welfare concerns loom large (for example, ambu-
lances), but it is difficult to discern policy concerns large enough to outweigh the efficiency
losses caused by regulating the taxi industry. The competitive model contemplates contin-
ued regulation of insurance, vehicle safety, and so forth; see generally Deborah L. Lyons and
Michael C. Ahn, Taxi Regulation in a Free Entry Market 41-61 (US Dept of Transporta-
tion, 1983), describing the Washington, D.C. taxicab regulatory scheme. The issue is thus
what social goal is served by entry and fare/rate regulations. Of course, the regulators just
may not know what they are doing. Even if the "stupid regulators" explanation is intuitively
appealing, however, we cannot make any predictions or conclusions from this rationale.
71 See Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Televi-
sion Industry, 3 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 98, 110-11 (1972).
7' Affiliated Capital Corp. v City of Houston, 735 F2d 1555, 1563 (5th Cir 1984) (en
banc).
"o See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J L & Econ 55, 57 (1968) (perva-
sive rate regulation of public utilities would be unnecessary in a world of competitive
franchising because the firms would compete away any supracompetitive profits in the at-
tempt to enter the market; later supracompetitive pricing would be checked by potential
competition for the renewal rights). But see Tom Hudson & Assoc., 746 F2d at 1373-74 (city
awarded exclusive trash-hauling franchise without any competitive bidding).
"1 See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci
335 (1974). For a recent example, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Who's Behind the Cable Scam,
Wall St J A10 (Mar 30, 1990): "The cable industry's lobbyists are attempting to forestall
what they fear most-competition-by compromising on what they fear less-regulation."
82 Professor Stigler puts this point very strongly. "We propose the general hypothesis:
every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to
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political process to gain market power, participants in the regu-
lated industry acquire the ability to exact monopoly rents because
they are protected from price competition by later entrants.
Empirical evidence supports this interpretation. One nation-
wide study of taxicabs, for example, concluded that "[t]here is no
persuasive economic rationale for some of the most important reg-
ulations," particularly entry control and minimum fares.83 The
study found that abolition of such restrictions resulted in more
firms, less concentrated markets, more cabs in service, and lower
fares. '4 The conclusion that the taxicab industry has captured the
regulatory process is inescapable.8 5
Of course, municipal regulation does not always represent cap-
ture and should not be condemned categorically. Rather, the high
likelihood of capture in the municipal context may in itself be suf-
ficient reason not to embrace a pure hands-off approach. The Su-
preme Court has recognized the dangers inherent in municipal reg-
ulation: "If municipalities were free to make economic choices
counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without re-
gard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armor
of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the com-
prehensive national policy Congress established."8' 6
Allowing municipal supervision of our taxi company would be
just such a chink. If we accept the capture theory, or even concede
that it is possible, then what safeguard is left to protect consum-
ers? Only their votes. But while the lack of a supervision require-
ment for municipal defendants 7 reflects in part the effectiveness
of voter control over local government, the same considerations do
not hold for anticompetitive activities of private parties.
First, consumers face a classic collective action problem: a
small, organized interest group will systematically prevail over a
control entry." George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ &
Mgmt Sci 3, 5 (1971). Note that there may be one or several firms in the industry; regardless
of the number of incumbents, they will seek to exclude later entrants into the market.
83 Frankena and Pautler, An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation at 155 (cited in
note 67).
84 Id at 156. For a detailed account of regulatory capture in the Chicago taxicab market,
see Edmund W. Kitch, Marc Isaacson, and Daniel Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs in
Chicago, 14 J L & Econ 285 (1971). For other empirical studies of capture, see Posner, 5
Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci at 336-37 & n 3 (cited in note 81).
85 See Ronald F. Kirby, et al, Para-Transit: Neglected Options for Urban Mobility 63
(US Dept of Transportation, 1974). Municipal taxicab regulation has in fact become a stock
illustration of regulatory capture. See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-
Being, and Public Choice, 57 U Chi L Rev 63, 87-88 (1990).
86 Lafayette, 435 US at 408 (plurality opinion).
87 See text at notes 24-26.
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large, disorganized one, even though the resulting regulation harms
the large group or results in a social loss.8 The taxicab industry,
with narrow objectives, can influence the regulatory regime to fur-
ther its own ends; the consumers, who bear the costs of the system,
are too widely dispersed for effective counteraction. Moreover,
there is little reason to believe that consumers in fact recognize
anticompetitive behavior in local services when it occurs, because
the marginal effect on the individual consumer is relatively small.
The efficacy of democratic control also depends on the iden-
tity of the actor. In the case of public trash collection, for example,
the city's name on the trucks and bills serves as a constant re-
minder to the consumer of the responsible party. If the consumer
does in fact recognize the anticompetitive behavior, the ill will en-
gendered reflects directly on the city itself. The likelihood of a
public outcry would be considerably less if a private company, os-
tensibly unassociated with the city, were to engage in the same
activity.
The collective action problem thus severely undermines the ef-
fectiveness of voter control; information costs, both in recognizing
the inefficient behavior and in identifying the responsible actor,
exacerbate the ineffectiveness of the voter control mechanism. 9
B. The Role of Antitrust Law: A Proposed Solution
1. The correct interpretation of state supervision.
For the reasons identified, primarily the ease of producer cap-
ture at the municipal level and the ineffectiveness of democratic
control, some review process is necessary to protect the welfare of
consumers and promote competition and efficiency in local services
markets. Recognizing the potential problems with municipal super-
vision does not imply, however, that the antitrust laws should be
used to require substantive review of local policies by federal
courts.90
Instead, courts evaluate antitrust immunity claims under a
procedural test, based on state authorization and state supervision.
This approach examines only the objective relationship between
See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action 29 (Harvard, 1965).
" The same problems, particularly the small marginal effect of anticompetitive local
services regulation, seriously weaken the argument that consumers can "vote with their
feet" by moving; the marginal benefits from such a move will often be outweighed by its
costs. For an elaboration of the voting through mobility argument, see Easterbrook, 26 J L
& Econ at 33-35 (cited in note 15).
11 See text following note 23.
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the state and the private defendant; it thus avoids the pitfalls of
substantive review while ensuring that the challenged activity is
truly "state action" rather than merely a "gauzy cloak" of state
involvement. This same procedural test can solve the problems of
municipal supervision. The authorization must always come from a
sovereign state entity; the supervision requirement should not be
deemed satisfied unless the supervisor is part of the state itself.
The state legislature and supreme court are sovereign, and
thus constitute "the state"; in their administrative capacity, state
agencies can also represent the state for supervisory purposes be-
cause they serve the state's ends and promote state policies. A mu-
nicipality, on the other hand, is subject to pressures that may pro-
duce policies at odds with those of the state. The first Midcal
prong does not adequately protect the state's interest because very
general grants of power can satisfy the authorization require-
ment;91 the state may not contemplate an anticompetitive imple-
mentation of regulatory authorization.
The Supreme Court recently stated that
[t]he active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that
state officials have and exercise power to review particular an-
ticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that
fail to accord with state policy. Absent such a program of su-
pervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's
anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than
merely the party's individual interests.2
The state agency can review the challenged activity to determine
whether it is in fact pursuant to state authorization and consistent
with state policy. Particularly in contrast to federal courts, state
agencies are well qualified for this role. A court presented with an
antitrust claim can then evaluate the relationships among the state
entities. If a state agency supervises the private party, the court
can conclude that the activity furthers a state policy, and thus that
federalism precludes antitrust liability.
If supervision by the municipality were deemed sufficient to
confer immunity, however, no procedural means would exist to en-
sure the challenged activity's consistency with state policy. Munici-
pal supervision simply does not serve the evidentiary function of
the supervision requirement because the court cannot infer from it
that the challenged activity accords with state policy. Thus munic-
"1 See note 108.
92 Patrick, 486 US at 101 (emphasis added).
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ipal supervision should not satisfy the Supreme Court's require-
ment that all private anticompetitive activity be actively super-
vised by the "State itself."' 3
Deference to the "State itself" represents a compromise be-
tween the antitrust laws and principles of federalism. The antitrust
laws have as their foundation Congress's desire to protect competi-
tion;94 courts should promote this objective except when specific
exemptions control. One such exemption is for state action,
founded on federalism. But governmental regulation may decrease
allocative efficiency, contrary to the aims of the antitrust laws.
Thus, "[t]he Parker doctrine represents an attempt to resolve con-
flicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the goals
of the antitrust laws, unfettered competition in the marketplace. '95
In contrast, the federal government owes no deference to mu-
nicipalities; there is no such animal as municipalism. As with all
exemptions to the antitrust laws, the state action doctrine should
be construed as narrowly as possible to avoid frustrating the pur-
poses of the Sherman Act.96 Only activity that is truly "state ac-
tion" should escape antitrust scrutiny. Thus, the conduct of pri-
vate actors in the local sphere should be subject to antitrust
scrutiny, unless the state itself (the legislature, highest court, or an
agency with statewide powers) actively supervises the challenged
activity.
2. What state supervision entails.
This supervisory requirement need not be onerous or wasteful.
The Supreme Court's state action cases establish that "active su-
'3 The states want more control over Parker immunity. For example, during hearings
on the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (see text at notes 118-28), the representative
of the National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL") testified as follows: "The Boul-
der decision expressly left to the states the power to immunize local activities from federal
antitrust liability. NCSL is not in favor of rolling back this portion of the opinion because of
our view that in a federal system of dual sovereigns, immunization decisions properly be-
long to the states." HR Rep No 98-965, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 13 n 19 (1984) (statement of
State Legislator Dick Hemstad) (emphasis added). The approach proposed in this Comment
is thus consistent with the policy of deference to state interests, the foundation of the state
action doctrine.
" See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66 (Basic, 1978) (describing the Sher-
man Act as a "consumer welfare prescription"); quoted with approval in Reiter v Sonotone
Corp., 442 US 330, 343 (1979).
" Southern Motor Carriers, 471 US at 61.
" See, for example, Lafayette, 435 US at 398-400; Group Life & Health Insurance Co.
v Royal Drug Co., Inc., 440 US 205, 231 (1979). See also Abbott Laboratories v Portland




pervision" is not to be taken in its literal sense. A requirement of
actual state involvement in the anticompetitive conduct itself
would create large administrative costs with no obvious benefits.
While it is convenient and customary to refer to state supervision
of the challenged activity, the Midcal test actually requires super-
vision only of the policy underlying that activity.9 7 So stated, it is
clear that actual state involvement in the challenged activity is un-
necessary to satisfy the Midcal requirement. The supervision re-
quirement actually entails a substantive review process whereby a
state organ has the opportunity to evaluate the challenged activity;
the subsequent ratification, modification, or invalidation of the ac-
tivity ensures that the conduct really is "state action."
In Midcal, for example, the Court struck down the challenged
price-fixing scheme because the state merely authorized price set-
ting and enforced the prices. The Court provided a list of what the
state did not do, indicating some practices that are important in
evaluating a claim of adequate supervision. These factors include
establishing prices, reviewing the reasonableness of the prices set,
regulating terms of contracts, and monitoring market conditions.
The Court noted that, in short, the state did not engage in any
"pointed reexamination" of the program."' Thus although the state
had something to do with the system, its involvement was merely a
"gauzy cloak" that would not shield the defendants from antitrust
liability.9
Patrick offers the clearest example of the Court's view of the
supervision requirement. The plaintiff was a physician who had
been suspended following a peer review investigation. He sued,
claiming the process was an illegal restraint of trade. The defend-
ants successfully asserted a state action defense in the lower
courts, but lost in the Supreme Court. Although the defendants
claimed that three different state organs supervised the challenged
activity, the Court held that the requirements of active supervision
were not met.
First, the state Health Division had power to review general
hospital procedures. The Court held that because it could not su-
pervise or review individual peer review decisions, it did not ac-
tively supervise the conduct at issue. 100 Second, the state Board of
" Midcal, 445 US at 105. All references to "active supervision" in this Comment are
meant to be read in this light.
,S Id at 106.
9 Id.
100 486 US at 102-03.
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Medical Examiners required notification of any peer review proce-
dures. But since the board lacked power to review or revise them,
the Court held that it did not supervise the conduct either." 1 Fi-
nally, the defendants argued that the state courts were available
for the plaintiff to air his grievances, and that therefore they su-
pervised the challenged activity. The Court disagreed, because ju-
dicial review would be limited to procedural issues in the investiga-
tion; the substance of the disciplinary process was beyond the state
courts' jurisdiction and competence. 10 2
The Patrick decision suggests that to satisfy Midcal, some
state organ must have the following powers: actual authority to re-
view the contested conduct, power to revise or reverse the chal-
lenged decision, and the ability to conduct a substantive inquiry
into the activities being reviewed.0 ' Only if all three conditions are
met can there truly be "active state supervision."
Requiring a state agency to supervise our taxi company there-
fore means only that consumers and potential competitors have a
state forum in which to voice their objections to the current re-
gime. The state is thus given the opportunity to ratify-or strike
down-the challenged activity, ensuring that it is in fact consistent
with state policy. The municipality can continue to be the active
decisionmaker, and in the majority of cases the agency will remain
uninvolved. But the existence of a review procedure provides a
check on the local producers that would not exist if municipal su-
pervision were sufficient to confer antitrust immunity.
3. Promoting competition through state supervision.
Consumers will benefit from the proposed approach because it
will spur regulatory reform, resulting in more competitive local ser-
vices markets. Since the Supreme Court's Boulder decision, which
held that municipalities are not ipso facto immune under the
Parker doctrine, the threat of antitrust liability has proven to be a
major factor in taxicab deregulation.10 4 The Federal Trade Com-
mission has attempted to encourage regulatory reform in taxicab
101 Id at 103.
102 Id at 103-05.
103 See Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 1 212.7 at 884 (cited in note 39); accord,
New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v FTC, 908 F2d 1064, 1074 (1st Cir 1990); Matter of
Ticor, 1989 FTC LEXIS 80, *17-18.
10 See, for example, L. Carol Shaw, et al, 1 Taxicab Regulation in U.S. Cities 93-94
(US Dept of Transportation, 1983) (antitrust concerns were one of five "motivating cata-




markets through the use of antitrust prosecutions.105 Although
such efforts have met with mixed success, they illustrate the pow-
erful coercive effect of antitrust liability. 10
Pressure on the municipality will be largely ineffective, how-
ever, if municipal supervision can satisfy the Midcal test. The
dominant firms, who as organized interest groups will have more
influence than the large number of consumers who could benefit
from the change, I0 7 will vigorously oppose reform, and the city it-
self will rarely face antitrust liability, since its activities need only
be pursuant to state authorization. 0 s Municipal politicians thus
have little incentive to embrace deregulation, because presumably
they benefit more from promoting the interests of the regulated
industry than those of consumers. 0 9 Since by hypothesis these
firms wield sufficient political influence to secure anticompetitive
municipal regulation initially, it is disingenuous to suppose that
106 The FTC filed complaints against the cities of Minneapolis and New Orleans, alleg-
ing that their regulations resulted in anticompetitive taxicab markets in violation of § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC § 45 (1988). See Matter of the City of Minne-
apolis, 105 FTC 304 (1985); Matter of the City of New Orleans, 105 FTC 1 (1985). After the
suit was filed, Minneapolis revised its taxicab regulations; the FTC found that "[tihese
changes offer the prospect of preventing the anticompetitive conduct alleged in the com-
plaint by strongly facilitating new entry into the Minneapolis taxicab market" and therefore
withdrew the complaint. 105 FTC at 309. The New Orleans action was thwarted, however,
when the state legislature enacted a statute that specifically empowered cities to regulate
entry and fares in the taxicab market; the FTC was therefore forced to withdraw its com-
plaint. 105 FTC at 5-6.
106 Edmund W. Kitch, Taxi Reform-The FTC Can Hack It, Regulation 13, 15 (May/
June 1984), argues that using the antitrust laws in this manner is an effective means of
increasing competition and removing "clogs on interstate commerce imposed by local regu-
lation." See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
Harv L Rev 4, 51 (1984) (when interest group pressures result in anticompetitive regulation
with interstate consequences, "courts should become more active in preserving competition
under the auspices of federal antitrust law"). Several other cities did in fact deregulate taxis
in the wake of the FTC actions. Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission at Sev-
enty-five (unpublished manuscript; on file with U Chi L Rev).
107 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action at 65 (cited in note 88); see also text at notes
81-89. In Shaw, et al, 2 Taxicab Regulation in U.S. Cities at 81, 86 (cited in note 104), the
authors provide an example of the stakes involved: regulatory reform in Sacramento, Cali-
fornia increased the number of taxicab companies from three to nineteen and reduced the
dominant firm's market share from 70% to less than 50%. Although in this instance deregu-
lation triumphed despite the opposition of the market leader, the incentive to oppose dereg-
ulation is obviously great.
108 State authorization is routinely found in state action cases. Although Boulder held
that the general grant of "home rule" powers was not sufficient authorization, see 455 US at
52-57, little more specificity is required. For example, an Illinois statute empowering munic-
ipalities to "prescribe [the] compensation" of taxicab drivers has been held to authorize the
city of Chicago's entry restrictions and fare regulations for taxicabs generally. Campbell v
City of Chicago, 823 F2d 1182, 1184-85 (7th Cir 1987).
109 See text at notes 81-89.
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supervision by the same municipality will lessen the harmful im-
pact of that policy on consumers.
Requiring state supervision alters the political dynamics, po-
tentially resulting in more efficient regulation. First, the regulated
industry may well have less influence at the state than at the local
level. 110 State regulators will be able to review the situation more
objectively and are likely to be more proficient in assessing the ef-
fects of regulatory policies.11' Municipal regulators are frequently
either inexpert political appointees, or entities such as police de-
partments for which economic regulation is a secondary function.
Although municipal regulators may have more day-to-day knowl-
edge of the regulated industry, the risk of regulatory capture off-
sets these potential efficiency gains. Any particularized knowledge
of consumer needs is useless if the regulator acts in the interest of
the industry. Finally, exposing the private parties to antitrust lia-
bility serves as a disincentive to oppose deregulation. Under the
proposed approach, it is more likely that inefficient regulation will
be revised, thereby enhancing consumer welfare by promoting
competition in local services markets.
IV. CRITICISM AND RESPONSE
A. Applicability of Other Limitations on Antitrust Liability
The state action doctrine, of course, is not the only device
available to private defendants seeking to escape antitrust liability.
This section briefly discusses the two other important limitations
on antitrust liability and their relation to the proposed approach.
1. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Certain political activity is exempted from antitrust liability
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.:" Specifically, attempts to
influence the legislature to pass laws or the executive to enforce
them are not subject to Sherman Act scrutiny." 3 Similarly, at-
tempts to influence agencies, as well as recourse to the courts, are
protected activities." 4 Some courts have interpreted the Noerr-
110 See text at note 130.
" One commentator has termed this phenomenon "economies of expertise." Timothy
J. Brennan, Local Government Action and Antitrust Policy: An Economic Analysis, 12
Fordham Urb L J 405, 410 (1984).
"' See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US 127
(1961); United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 US 657 (1965).
123 See California Motor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 510 (1972).
14 Id. An important limitation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the "sham" excep-
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Pennington doctrine to immunize private parties in municipal su-
pervision cases merely because some governmental actor (the mu-
nicipality) is involved. The reasoning usually proceeds as follows:
the municipality itself is exempt because of the state action doc-
trine, while the private defendant is exempt because the regulatory
scheme is political activity, for which it cannot be held liable under
Noerr-Pennington.115
This reasoning is flawed. Even if the initial lobbying for the
franchise is protected political activity, there is no reason to hold
subsequent anticompetitive practices exempt from the antitrust
laws. To do so would render nugatory the entire state action doc-
trine as applied to private parties. If the mere involvement of a
political process sufficed to remove the resultant activity perma-
nently from antitrust scrutiny, no private anticompetitive scheme
could be challenged successfully despite its harmful effects on con-
sumers. The defendant in such a suit would not need to prove ei-
ther state authorization or state supervision, but could merely
point to the involvement of some governmental entity and cite No-
err-Pennington. Such a result obviously conflicts both with the Su-
preme Court's antitrust framework and the goal of protecting
consumers.
The correct application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to
the issue of municipal supervision requires a distinction between
the acquisition of anticompetitive power and its subsequent use.
Under Noerr-Pennington, the private party seeking anticompeti-
tive regulation or legislation is exempt from the antitrust laws; 1 6
legitimate attempts to influence the political process are the very
activities that the doctrine was designed to protect. Once a private
party has gained the power to act anticompetitively, however, the
inquiry should shift to the Parker doctrine.117 Independent an-
ticompetitive activities cannot properly be characterized as politi-
tion: private parties can lose the immunity by abuse of the political process. See Noerr, 365
US at 144; see generally Trucking Unlimited, 404 US at 511-16. Whether a regulated en-
tity's attempts to capture the regulatory process could be considered an abuse is a question
of fact; this Comment assumes that the initial pressure on the agency or government is
protected activity. Persistent opposition to new entrants by incumbent firms, however, such
as might occur in the taxicab industry, may constitute an antitrust violation not covered by
Noerr-Pennington. See Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508 (denying immunity for such
conduct).
115 See, for example, Independent Taxicab Drivers' Employees, 760 F2d at 612-13.
16 Such activity, absent Noerr-Pennington, could be actionable as a conspiracy under
§ 1 or an attempt to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 USC §§ 1, 2 (1988).
"7 For an argument similar to that presented in the text, with examples to illustrate its
application, see Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 1 212.8 at 161-63 (cited in note 39).
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cal action; Noerr-Pennington is simply inapplicable. Rather, if the
actor is to escape antitrust liability, the private activity must be
actively supervised by the state itself and thereby qualify for the
state action exemption.
2. The Local Government Antitrust Act.
In 1984, Congress passed the Local Government Antitrust Act
("LGAA"),l" s which exempts local governments from monetary
damage liability in antitrust cases. 1 9 The LGAA also exempts cer-
tain private conduct from monetary damages.120 Congress was con-
cerned that recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly Boulder,
had rendered municipal liability under the state action doctrine
uncertain, and that the threat of large damage awards was both
unnecessary and potentially harmful.1 21 This congressional action
does nothing, however, to alter the analysis presented in this Com-
ment; in fact, the legislative history supports the position
advocated.
First, anticompetitive behavior is fully actionable after the
passage of the LGAA; only the treble damage liability has been
removed.1 22 In actions arising out of local services regulation, con-
sumer welfare is enhanced by cessation of the anticompetitive
practices. Significantly, injunctive relief remains available to anti-
trust plaintiffs under the LGAA;12 3 frustrated rivals or other inter-
ested parties can therefore sue in equity to redress anticompetitive
practices or gain entry into a market. In such a case, the principles
set forth above should be followed. Furthermore, private parties
lose the protection afforded by the LGAA if they engage in an-
ticompetitive activity not contemplated by the local government. 1 2
"8 Pub L No 98-544, 98 Stat 2750 (1984), codified at 15 USC §§ 34-36 (1988).
119 15 USC § 35 (1988).
120 15 USC § 36 (1988).
121 HR Rep No 98-965 at 7-11 (cited in note 93). The Director of the FTC's Bureau of
Competition at the time has argued that the LGAA was passed partly in response to the
FTC's taxicab enforcement attempts (see notes 105-06). Muris, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion at Seventy-five (cited in note 106).
12 The LGAA "eliminates certain damage suits under the Clayton Act without altering
... the substantive antitrust law." HR Rep No 98-965 at 2 (cited in note 93) (emphasis
added). Treble damages are ordinarily available in antitrust actions under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 USC § 15 (1988).
123 Injunctive relief is provided for under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 USC § 26, which is
not affected by the LGAA.
1.4 See S Rep No 98-593, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 7-8 (1984); HR Rep No 98-965 at 21-22
(cited in note 93).
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The legislative history of the LGAA supports the position that
municipal supervision does not satisfy the Midcal state action test.
In the Conference Report that accompanied the final version of the
LGAA, the joint committee explained that "the conferees intend
that Parker and subsequent cases interpreting it shall apply by
analogy to the conduct of a local government in directing the ac-
tions of non-governmental parties, as if the local government were
a state. '12 5 Such an extension of supervisory power would be com-
pletely unnecessary if municipalities already had such power under
the state action doctrine. Congress thus understood Parker not to
apply to private activities supervised by a municipality and in-
cluded such activities in the LGAA because they would otherwise
be subject to the full force of the antitrust laws.
Examples used by the drafters to illustrate application of the
law confirm this interpretation. The House Report contemplates
the grant of an exclusive franchise to an airport restaurant,12
while the Senate Report discusses an exclusive ambulance
franchise. 27 Their inclusion in the legislative history indicates that
both houses of Congress believed that private activities protected
from competition by local government would not be exempt from
liability under the state action doctrine: parties immunized by
Parker would have no need of protection under the LGAA. 128
B. Objections to the Proposed Solution
Although disallowing municipal supervision as a basis for pri-
vate party immunity in antitrust cases promotes both the eco-
nomic and the political aims of the antitrust laws, objections can of
course be advanced. In this section, I respond to three such chal-
lenges. First, although agencies are themselves prone to capture,
agency supervision is preferable to municipal oversight. Second,
the recurrent argument that the Parker doctrine-and the ap-
proach I advocate-allows courts to substitute their economic
judgment for that of the states should be discounted. Finally, the
proposed solution strains neither the competence of the agencies
nor the status quo of political power.
125 HR Rep No 98-1158, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1984) (emphasis added); see also HR
Rep No 98-965 at 25 (cited in note 93) (additional views of Representative Brooks): "This
extension to private firms is an attempt to express and codify the existing court developed
'state-action' doctrine[] at the local level."
" HR Rep No 98-965 at 21 (cited in note 93).
117 S Rep No 98-593 at 7 (cited in note 124).
, See HR Rep No 98-965 at 19 (cited in note 93) (state agencies are not included in
the LGAA because "[s]uch entities receive antitrust immunity directly from the 'state-ac-
tion' doctrine").
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1. Agency capture.
The argument for disallowing municipal supervision rests on
the possibility of capture by the regulated private parties. State
agencies, however, are also subject to capture; arguably, the pro-
posed solution will merely cause private actors to shift the focus of
their lobbying efforts. While this objection has some force, disal-
lowing municipal supervision will nevertheless have both federal-
ism and efficiency benefits.
First, agency capture may be one of the necessary conse-
quences of the federalism regime created by the state action cases.
Parker itself, for example, involved a scheme proposed-and
largely controlled-by raisin growers to restrict output and thereby
raise the price of raisins. But the Court held that some anticom-
petitive state activities must be outside the sphere of federal anti-
trust law. Recognizing a zone of exempted activities necessarily im-
plies that some conduct otherwise actionable will escape liability.
The boundary of this zone, however, has been drawn at the state
level; there is no reason for courts to ignore anticompetitive con-
duct that is not state action.1 9
Furthermore, shifting the focus of inquiry from the municipal
to the state level should result in fewer successful capture at-
tempts. The producers of local services may well wield considera-
ble influence in the city in which they operate; at the state level
their lobbying abilities will be markedly diminished. 30 Any reduc-
tion in producers' ability to capture the regulatory process will di-
rectly benefit consumers by making efficient regulation more likely.
It may be objected that if we are concerned with regulatory
capture, then the state action doctrine should be interpreted to
prevent capture, rather than merely make it more difficult. Thus,
some courts have suggested that the municipality's exemption
should extend to private parties so long as the municipality re-
mains the effective decisionmaker. One court framed the issue as
follows: "Were the City of Detroit's decisions that permitted the
defendants to retain their exclusive cable television franchise made
by the City, or did [the defendants] have so much influence that
the decisions were effectively those of the private defendants?"''
129 See text at notes 18-20.
.SO See Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77, 83-
84 (New Amer Lib, 1961) (justifying a federal government on the grounds that larger politi-
cal units are less susceptible to capture by "factions").
"' City Communications, Inc. v City of Detroit, 660 F Supp 932, 935, denying recon-
sideration of 650 F Supp 1570 (E D Mich 1987).
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The court held that if the city effectively made the decisions, its
immunity would extend to the private defendants; but if they had
captured the regulatory process then state-not munici-
pal-supervision would be required." 2 The appeal of such a test
lies in its recognition of the capture problem and its straightfor-
ward response. 33
Relying on capture itself to define the boundaries of the state
action doctrine is nonetheless problematic. First, it requires federal
courts to engage in a substantive inquiry into the relationship be-
tween the private defendant and the municipality-the type of in-
quiry that the state action doctrine seeks to avoid at the state
level. A test based on capture is also potentially ineffective. Al-
though the theory of capture has long been recognized and is gen-
erally accepted by economists,13 4 actual instances are difficult to
demonstrate. In any individual case, it may be impossible to prove
the existence or nonexistence of capture. Such a test would there-
fore require a presumption either in favor of or against regulatory
capture. But for the very reason that a presumption is neces-
sary-the difficulty of proving capture-creating such a presump-
tion will often be dispositive of the issue. The effect of such a rule,
therefore, would be largely the same as simply allowing or disal-
lowing municipal supervision to satisfy Midcal.
Another objection to agency review is that important policy
decisions are removed to an unelected, and therefore unaccounta-
ble, entity. This argument fails, however, for at least two reasons.
First, it rests on the faulty premise that decisions made by munici-
palities are accountable to the electorate; as demonstrated,
problems of collective action and information costs seriously un-
dermine municipal accountability. This objection also fails to rec-
ognize the accountability of agencies to the state legislature, and
hence derivatively to the electorate as a whole; evidence suggests
that through appropriations, appointments, and other devices
agency action is effectively checked by elected government offi-
131 Id. In a later proceeding, the court held that the city was in fact the effective deci-
sionmaker and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 695 F Supp 911, 915 (E D
Mich 1988).
133 One commentator has proposed a similar approach, in which local regulation escapes
antitrust scrutiny only if it is tailored to a specific market failure, and the defendant could
disprove a presumption of capture. The nonexistence of capture in both cases is the touch-
stone that confers antitrust immunity. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Anti-
trust Federalism, 99 Harv L Rev 713 (1986).
134 See generally Hovenkamp, 57 U Chi L Rev at 86-89 (cited in note 85).
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cials.135 The suggested approach may therefore actually enhance
democratic control.
2. Creeping Lochnerism?
Critics have labeled the Supreme Court's state action jurispru-
dence a return to substantive due process, with economic efficiency
substituted for liberty of contract." 6 The implication is that only
those economic regulations of which courts approve will be consid-
ered state action. Because the proposed approach will result, at
least in the short run, in the invalidation of some regulatory
schemes, this criticism will likely be made.
The legal distinction between Lochner-type intervention and
Parker review is profound. Anticompetitive activity is made affirm-
atively illegal by the Sherman Act; without the state action doc-
trine, courts could invalidate under the Supremacy Clause all regu-
lation that restrained trade. The Parker exemption is thus a safe
harbor for anticompetitive state regulation. In sharp contrast to
the era of substantive due process, the Court here refrains from
using power it already has, rather than extending its authority be-
yond that granted by statute or the Constitution.13 7
Nevertheless, it may be argued that by selective application,
the Parker doctrine permits courts to engage in an otherwise im-
permissible substantive review of the merits of economic regula-
tion. Although it is true that some lower courts have erroneously
decided state action cases in this way,"8" the Supreme Court has
consistently followed an exclusively process-oriented approach. 13 9
The two-pronged Midcal test requires a court to find authorization
and supervision; both are ascertainable without any inquiry into
the substance of the challenged activity. Regulation that satisfies
Midcal is considered consistent with state policy and therefore ex-
empt as state action; all other regulation is subject to antitrust
review.
13 Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J Pol Econ 765,
790-93 (1983).
"' See, for example, Hovenkamp and Mackerron, 32 UCLA L Rev at 758-65 (cited in
note 11). The famous case of Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905), is representative of
the era of substantive due process, during which the Court used the Due Process Clause to
strike down economic regulation.
137 See Lochner, 198 US at 75-76 (Holmes dissenting).
138 See, for example, Gold Cross Ambulance and Transfer v City of Kansas City, 705
F2d 1005, 1011-15 (8th Cir 1983).
"I Cantor v Detroit Edison Co., 428 US 579 (1976), is a possible exception. But the
case, which spawned five separate opinions, has had little precedential influence.
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The proposed solution to the problem of municipal supervi-
sion is therefore divorced from substantive judicial review of eco-
nomic policy. Federal antitrust courts are required, and permitted,
to examine only the objective relationship between the state and
the private actor. If the state review process qualifies as active su-
pervision, then state action immunity attaches; otherwise the de-
fendant cannot claim the exemption. Judgments regarding the ne-
cessity or desirability of the challenged activity have no place in
either the Midcal scheme or the approach proposed in this
Comment. 140
3. Local autonomy.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Boulder, noted that it would
be "rather odd to require municipal ordinances to be enforced by
the State rather than the city itself.' 41 Some lower courts have
seized on this language to justify municipal supervision,'42 and one
commentator has offered a similar criticism: "it would be implausi-
ble to rule that a city may regulate, say, taxi rates but only if a
state agency also supervises the private taxi operators."' 4 That is,
of course, precisely what I have proposed, but these objections are
inapposite.
Justice Rehnquist's criticism is certainly valid; state enforce-
ment of local policies would be both anomalous and duplicative.
But the approach suggested in this Comment does not entail state
enforcement of local regulation; rather, it requires state ratifica-
tion, following a substantive review, of private anticompetitive con-
duct. The distinction goes beyond semantics because enforcement
implies affirmative state participation in the routine affairs of local
government. Ratification, on the other hand, requires only state
14' Boulder itself illustrates the force of this point: the challenged activity was a three-
month moratorium on expansion by the monopoly cable provider so that the city could
solicit competitive bids; despite its welfare-enhancing effect the Court was forced to strike
down the regulation because it had no procedural means to evaluate its consistency with
state policy. 455 US at 45-46, 54-56. In contrast, the challenged activity in Orrin Fox was a
horizontal market division of auto dealerships, which would be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act absent state involvement. Because the Court found sufficient state involve-
ment, it upheld the restraint despite its harmful effect on consumers. New Motor Vehicle
Board of California v Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 US 96, 98, 109-11 (1978). If the Court truly
were engaging in Lochner-type review based on economic efficiency, it would have decided
both cases the opposite way.
"' Boulder, 455 US at 71 n 6 (Rehnquist dissenting).
142 See, for example, Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F2d at 1014-15.
14 Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 212.7 at 158 (cited in note 39).
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approval (or disapproval) of the anticompetitive activity if and
when it is challenged.144 Thus, because the proposed approach
leaves the decisional powers of local governments undisturbed,
concerns of state overinvolvement in local government activities
are unfounded.145
Professor Areeda's "implausibility" argument is similarly un-
persuasive. It rests on an assumption of duplicative regulation that
does not apply to the suggested approach. More importantly, his
very example is refuted by empirical evidence: at least 20% of the
states do in fact regulate taxicabs at the state level, many of them
in conjunction with local regulation. 146 Indeed, it would not be
"implausible" to require other local services to undergo similar
state supervision. All of the activities involved in local services reg-
ulation are closely analogous to activities currently regulated at the
state level. Taxicab and garbage truck regulation, for example,
could be reviewed by the same state agency that has jurisdiction
over trucking and similar activities. Ambulances could be super-
vised by a state health agency; cable operators by the state public
utility agency; and so forth.
Requiring a state agency to review local regulation would
strain neither the agency's competence nor the status quo of politi-
cal power. At the same time, municipalities can manage their own
affairs subject only to occasional state review. This argument al-
lows federal courts to adjudicate Parker claims by private parties
with a minimum of intrusion into state affairs, while at the same
time protecting consumer welfare.
CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine is a compromise between two often
contradictory policies: the economic goal of the antitrust laws to
secure the benefits of free competition for all consumers, and the
political aim of federalism, which requires the federal government
to defer to state regulatory choices despite their anticompetitive
effects.
The supervision requirement is a procedural test to aid federal
courts in ascertaining whether a private defendant is in fact pursu-
ing a valid state policy. To fulfill the supervision requirement and
14 See text at note 103.
145 A related objection, that municipal decisions are best made at the municipal level,
fails for the same reason. For an example of this objection, see Brennan, 12 Fordham Urb L
J at 407-09 (cited in note 111).
1 6 Shaw, et al, 1 Taxicab Regulation in U.S. Cities 7-11 (cited in note 104).
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avail itself of state action immunity, a private defendant should be
required to show that it is supervised by the state itself, defined as
the legislature, highest court, or an agency with statewide powers.
Municipal supervision should not satisfy this test, because there is
no assurance that the municipality is furthering state policy rather
than the anticompetitive interests of the regulated entity. Limiting
the state action doctrine in this way will enhance consumer welfare
by promoting competition in local services markets, striking the
correct balance between efficiency and federalism.

